

# Commodity Market Intelligence Update No. 3

Issue feature: Soy

## Finance and the Cerrado

Rising [global demand](#) for soy is driving increased investments in the [Cerrado](#), Brazil's vast tropical savanna that is home to some 12,000 [plant and animal species](#). These investments are accelerating land conversion, and come in two forms: infrastructure projects, which reduce the costs of production; and land acquisitions made by financial institutions and investment funds seeking [returns](#) from growing commodity production. Cropland in the Cerrado, and specifically in the region known as [Matopiba](#), which comprises the Northeastern states of Maranhão, Tocantins, Piauí, and Bahia, and [17%](#) of Brazil's land area, more than [doubled](#) between 2000 and 2013, and is [continuing to grow](#) as [international pressure](#) mounts to protect the biome. With only [7%](#) of the Cerrado legally protected, [infrastructure](#) coming online, and foreign investment laws [potentially set to ease](#), the Cerrado is being established as a frontier of land conversion in Brazil.

Over half of the Cerrado's [73 million hectares](#) of native landscape were converted between [2000](#) and [2015](#), largely driven by livestock and soybean farming. Though the Cerrado has not attracted as much attention as the Amazon, the conservation value of the region is enormous. The Cerrado is home to [137 species](#) of endangered animal, and over [40%](#) of its [11,000](#) plant species are endemic. Hidden biomass in the Cerrado landscape of small trees with deep root systems allows the region to sequester around [58 tons](#) of carbon per hectare, helping to mitigate climate change at a [comparable rate](#) to the Amazon. Additionally, [empirical studies](#) have confirmed regional climactic effects from land conversion in the Cerrado; notably, elevated [fire](#) and [drought](#) patterns which directly threaten the ecological integrity of both the Cerrado and the Amazon. An ecologically intact Cerrado can help deliver value for agricultural business by providing [climate predictability](#) and [regulation](#). Finally, [half](#) of Brazil's major river and wetland systems begin in the Cerrado, making the biome a critical [water collection ecosystem](#) and reliable source for Brazil's [hydroelectric power](#).

It is the Cerrado's agricultural capacity, however, rather than its ecological value, that is attracting foreign business and investment interests. Surging acquisition of Brazil's agricultural land from 2000-2009 led the country to [limit](#) the ability of foreign companies to acquire land for large-scale agriculture. A [2010](#) restriction prevented foreign companies from owning more than 25% of the rural lands of any municipality and [capped](#) at 5,000 hectares the maximum amount of land a foreign company could purchase. Foreign investment has persisted, however, sometimes by taking advantage of loopholes in the law by dealing with local intermediaries. For example, U.S.-based financial services company TIAA operated through a Brazilian company, Cosan, to [steadily acquire](#) land in excess of the capped amount in nine Brazilian states between 2008 and 2015. A third of these [landholdings](#), which [activists allege](#) had been illegally cleared, lay in Matopiba, illustrating the interplay between foreign finance, global soy demand, and land conversion.

Today, agricultural development in Matopiba is occurring through multiple channels. Ten foreign-owned agribusiness firms collectively control [1 million hectares](#) of arable land in the region. These significant landholdings are often planted with soy, and are part of the [4 million hectares](#) of land currently producing the commodity within Matopiba. These firms are owned by Canadian, American, European, and Japanese multinational financial institutions, and receive significant global financing and investment to carry out their operations on the ground. Global private equity funds are also increasingly interested in agriculture. As of 2017, [15 unlisted investment funds](#) employing \$2.5 billion in capital are targeting agriculture in Latin America. As [laws potentially change](#), these funds could be permitted to buy up large tracts of Brazilian land, possibly driving further land conversion in the Cerrado.

[Billions of dollars](#) in new infrastructure investments are also gradually changing the [dynamics](#) of soy production in Brazil. [Investments](#) in Matopiba, such as [new railways](#), [freshly paved roads](#), and [expanded grain terminals and ports](#) have significantly reduced costs for producers and traders, sometimes by up to [50%](#) compared with other Brazilian soy producing regions, accelerating the business case for soy production and incentivizing further investment. Infrastructure investments have been made by an array of transnational actors, including [Brazilian public banks](#), [global soy traders](#), [foreign state-owned companies](#), and indirectly through government financing made by [sovereign wealth funds](#).

Commodity Market Intelligence Update is a publication of the Good Growth Partnership's **Responsible Demand** Project



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Investment in Brazilian agriculture is also emerging as a key strategy for importing countries like China. Accounting for [over 50%](#) of Brazilian soybean exports, and [a third](#) of soy exported from the Cerrado, China is keen to ensure the uninterrupted flow of soy to supply animal feed for its expanding [meat industry](#). In 2017, Chinese investment in Brazil hit a [record high](#), as companies completed [17 infrastructure and acquisition deals](#), some directed towards bringing soy to port. China's [Citic Agri Fund](#) has made \$2.5 billion available for new [agricultural investments](#) in Brazil, including for the cultivation of soy and rice, and Chinese groups have made legal [direct purchases](#) of agricultural land for soy production. Chinese agricultural investment has generally been targeted in [Mato Grosso](#) but may [expand](#) to Matopiba as available infrastructure and costs of production continue to gain advantage over other regions.

There is heightened awareness of the value of land in the Cerrado – both by conservationists who aim to protect it – and by businesses who seek its development to feed growing demand for soy. Measures like the voluntary 2006 [Soy Moratorium](#) have been [successful](#) in limiting deforestation in the [Brazilian Amazon](#), but have not been extended to frontiers of soy production like the Cerrado. In 2017, broad recognition of the Cerrado's extraordinary [ecological value](#) led to the [Cerrado Manifesto](#), a pledge to halt any further deforestation or native vegetation loss in the biome that was signed by over [60 global companies](#), signaling a desire to eliminate land conversion from their supply chains. Still, both the growing scale of international investment and plethora of actors involved underscore the difficulty of balancing soy production with conservation in the Cerrado.




### Agroideal - Sustainable Agriculture in the Cerrado

18 global and Brazilian soy traders, banks, NGOs, consultancies, and research organizations have launched [Agroideal](#), a decision support tool that facilitates sustainable commodity production in Latin America. An open-source tool targeted at decision-makers in the soy supply chain, Agroideal allows users to direct sourcing, planting, and investment strategies to areas that meet environmental pledges regarding the sustainable expansion of soy production. The tool currently covers soy for the entire Brazilian Cerrado, with plans to extend to the Argentine Chaco. A beef version of Agroideal covering the Amazon, Cerrado, and Chaco biomes will be launched in 2019.


## Trends in Soy Demand

China continues to be the leading driver of global soy demand (first chart below). In 2017, China accounted for almost [two-thirds](#) of global soybean imports, a share expected to rise to 70% by 2027 (second chart below). [Over half](#) of China's soybean imports were sourced from Brazil, including from the [Cerrado](#). China's [rapid development](#) has led per-capita meat consumption to [quadruple](#) since 1990; [80%](#) of China's soybean consumption is used to produce [feed](#) for animals raised for their meat. Soybean oil, a byproduct of China's large-scale [soy crushing](#) operations, is even starting to displace imported [palm oil](#) as a cooking oil and food ingredient. Chinese companies have been [investing heavily](#) in Brazil, including to ensure the steady flow of soybeans to Brazil's ports. Escalating [trade tensions](#) between China and the U.S., the [second largest](#) soybean exporting country, may mean even greater [Chinese demand for Brazilian soy](#) in the future. Source: [USDA](#) and author's calculations. Consumption accounts for double counting of soybeans crushed for soymeal. Data as of end-2017.

### Largest Soy Consuming Countries\*




### China's Soybean Imports








Global Soy Consumption by Uses



Share of Global Soy Exports




[Rising global demand](#) for animal protein-based diets is a key driver of soy expansion. [85%](#) of all soybeans are crushed to produce soymeal, the majority of which is used to feed animals raised for their meat, eggs, and milk (first chart above). Whole soybeans, soymeal, and soy oil are also used in food products, like tofu, as a cooking oil; in [biofuels](#); and for some [industrial applications](#) such as adhesives. Brazil currently supplies 42% of global soybean exports, but land expansion, infrastructure investments, and an advantage in soybean [protein content](#) is expected to raise Brazil's export share to 47%\* by 2027 (second chart above). Conversion of native vegetation for soy cultivation is occurring in biomes with high conservation value, like the Brazilian [Cerrado](#) and the Paraguayan and Argentine [Gran Chaco](#). Source: USDA, World Wildlife Fund, and author's calculations. \*Adding Argentina, their combined market share becomes 54%.

## Soy Traders and Infrastructure

Brazil's landscape of soy traders and infrastructure is evolving. Bunge, which exports 13% of Brazilian soybeans (first chart below), is in discussions to be acquired by rival commodity traders (see Key Companies Update), and new entrant COFCO has [emerged](#) as the [third-largest](#) exporter of Brazilian soybeans. COFCO is seeking to make further inroads in Brazil, including [increased investment](#) in Mato Grosso, which accounts for [25%](#) of Brazil's soybean production. Increased [infrastructure investment](#) in Matopiba, not only from [soy traders](#), but also from [Brazilian public banks](#) and [foreign state-owned companies](#), has greatly [reduced the costs](#) of producing and exporting soybeans from the region. The average distance to railways and paved roads, which account for [90%](#) of grain cargo transported in Brazil, is now less than half as far in Matopiba as Mato Grosso (second chart below), adding pressure to expand production in the region.

Largest Exporters of Brazilian Soybeans


2017, in % of total shipped volume



Source: Williams Shipping Agency, via Reuters. "Others" include soy traders such as Grupo Amaggi, BTG Pactual, and Coamo, as well as undisclosed and smaller exporters.

Ratio of Distance to Infrastructure

Matopiba vs. Mato Grosso



A value of 0.45 for "Paved Roads" means that the distance to paved roads in Matopiba is, on average, only 45% as far as in Mato Grosso. Source: Brazil Institute of Geography and Statistics, and author's calculations. Data as of 2017.

## Key Companies Update (all commodities)



Bunge, one of the [largest exporters](#) of Brazilian soybeans, is in discussions to be acquired by rival commodity traders. Both [Archer Daniels Midland](#) (ADM) and Switzerland's [Glencore](#) have expressed interest in a takeover, foreshadowing consolidation among large commodity traders as a [global grain glut](#) has [squeezed](#) profit margins. However, [antitrust issues](#) mean any potential deal will take time to materialize.

An ADM-Bunge merger would allow ADM to significantly expand its presence in Latin America by acquiring [numerous](#) ports, grain mills, refineries, and soy crushing plants in Brazil and Argentina. A combined entity would roughly [match the size](#) of Cargill, the largest commodity trader in terms of revenue, and would be capable of processing 25% of global soybean production, according to Bloomberg. It would become Argentina's [largest](#) grain exporter, overtaking COFCO's [17%](#) share of grains, including wheat, corn, and soy, shipped from the country. Glencore is currently a much [smaller player](#) in Brazilian soy.

Bunge also handles [4%](#) of globally shipped palm oil, and last year ventured into palm oil-based food ingredients after [acquiring](#) IOI Loders Croklaan. Both [ADM](#) and [Bunge](#) have soy and palm oil sustainability policies that would need to be aligned following a merger, including policies on traceability, zero deforestation, as well as how soybeans are [sourced](#) from the Cerrado biome.



Italian chocolate and confectionary manufacturer Ferrero, seeking to [diversify](#) its business away from Western Europe, has [acquired](#) the U.S. confectionary unit of Nestle for \$2.8 billion. Many confectionary products manufactured by the two companies use palm oil, palm kernel oil, and palm oil derivatives as primary ingredients. Ferrero used [181,000 tons](#) of palm oil in 2016, with 100% of its volume certified to the RSPO standard. Nestle used over [400,000 tons](#) of palm oil for its global operations in 2016 and has a [2020 goal](#) of 100% RSPO-certified palm oil.

While Nestle commands a [10% global market share](#) for confectionary products, it is unclear what volume of palm oil is directed towards products sold in the U.S. market. The U.S. accounts for about [20%](#) of global chocolate sales, and Ferrero will take control of over [20 confectionary brands](#), such as Butterfinger and 100Grand, becoming the [third-largest](#) confectionary company in the U.S., behind Mars and Hershey. Ferrero has emerged as a sustainability [leader](#) among food manufacturers, using 100% RSPO-certified segregated palm oil in its supply chain beginning in 2015. Ferrero has also [published a list](#) of 116 of its palm oil suppliers, but has not stated what volume of its palm oil they cover. Nestle has similarly [published a list](#) of direct suppliers, representing [91%](#) of the company's total palm oil volume.



[Ruchi Soya](#), India's [largest](#) edible oils manufacturer, is undergoing bankruptcy proceedings, and will likely be acquired by one or more large global edible oils companies. Ruchi is India's [largest player](#) in cooking oil and soy foods, with a [19%](#) market share in India's enormous edible oils market, reaching over a billion consumers. The company produces popular soy and palm oil-based [cooking oils](#) Ruchi Gold and Mahakosh, and operates [14 refineries](#) across India, which are coveted by bidders. Ruchi Soya has a [2020 goal](#) of 100% RSPO-certified palm oil, and owns [200,000 hectares](#) of oil palm plantation area across six Indian states.

Recognizing Ruchi Soya's strong position in the Indian market, several global companies have expressed interest in a full or minority stake in the company. Malaysia's Sime Darby, Indonesia's Musim Mas and U.S.-based Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland have all submitted [statements of interest](#) in Ruchi. Within India, palm oil importers Adani Wilmar, Emami, and [Patanjali Ayurved](#) have also [expressed](#) interest. India is the largest importing country of both [palm oil](#) and [soybean oil](#), both of which are widely used as cooking oils and in food products. Indonesia's exports of palm oil to India grew [32%](#) to a record 7.6 million tons in 2017. India is [seeking to expand](#) domestic palm oil production to lessen reliance on imports.



Blockchain and [cell-cultured meat](#) are fast emerging as new technological developments that could impact the global meat industry. [Blockchain technology](#), which involves verifiable and permanent data on transaction records, is already being tested in the Asian consumer market. Chinese E-commerce giant [Alibaba](#) plans to use the technology for [quality control](#) of New Zealand and Australian beef imports, and Australian startup [Beef Ledger](#) is developing a platform [targeting](#) Asia's expanding middle class. The platform will include provenance data and sale history, consumer feedback, and a streamlined payment system, all accessible through a [QR code](#) on packages of beef.

Another technology, cell-cultured meat, faces a longer road to general consumer acceptance but could appear in restaurants and grocery stores within [8 years](#). Recognizing its potentially viability, [Cargill and Tyson Foods](#) have made investments in a [startup](#) developing cell-cultured meat, and another [startup](#) plans to target the [Brazilian](#) domestic market with plant-based "alternative-meat" products. Some [analysts](#) see cell-cultured and plant-based meats as an avenue to satisfy rising global protein demand, rather than as a direct competitor to the international beef industry.

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